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What is the relationship between the direction and form of an energy transition and the political econ-
omy within which it is embedded? This paper explores how the nature of (low carbon) energy transitions
is strongly influenced by the process of neoliberalisation that shape energy policy in the South. We seek
to understand emergent energy transitions and to advance their theorisation through an account of the
political economy of energy transition in Kenya. In contrast to the often techno-managerial orientation of
literatures on socio-technical transitions, we explore the political terrain upon which competing visions
of energy futures and material interests collide and seek to accommodate one another. We develop a
political economy account that emphasises the structural and disciplinary power of capital and global
institutions to set the terms of transition. This expresses itself in both delimiting the autonomy of state
actors and by reconfiguring domestic institutional and social power in ways that shape the distributional
politics of transitions.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction private actors for the provision of public goods. With this endeav-Like many African countries, Kenya is at critical juncture with
respect to defining its energy future. The challenge it faces is to
enable a ‘just transition’ to a lower carbon economy: one that
delivers poverty reduction and climate resilience simultaneously
(Swilling and Annecke, 2012; Newell and Mulvaney, 2013).
Although this presents a social and technical challenge of stagger-
ing proportions, thinking about who sets the terms of transition
raises key political questions about the role of actors, interests
and institutions as they seek to advance competing energy path-
ways and associated technologies. Despite the relative paucity of
academic attention, or acknowledgement by policy-makers of their
importance, issues of power and political economy play a key role
in determining technological and social outcomes: the winners and
losers from different energy pathways, on whose terms the trade-
offs between competing policy objectives are resolved, and how.
This paper addresses these theoretical and practical challenges
through an account of the political economy of energy transitions
and the ways in which they are constrained and enabled by
processes of neoliberalisation. We refer to neoliberalisation not
as an end state, but rather as a contested and spatially and socially
uneven process through which ever more areas of political life are
subject to market discipline which increase the dependence onour we are responding to calls from others who find the ‘political
economy of energy transitions is a vastly understudied area’
(Goldthau and Sovacool, 2012: 238) amid ‘the need to foreground
social processes and power relations’ in transitions research
(Lawhon and Murphy, 2012: 355). In particular, we suggest that
forms of power derived from control over production, finance
and technology should assume a central place in accounts of the
politics of transition. We also emphasise the specificity of these
processes in the global South, where configurations of power
between states, donors and transnational capital have distinct
characteristics that have not been well captured by the Euro-
centric origins and focus of socio-technical transitions literature
to date (Baker et al., 2014; Swilling and Annecke, 2012). We
develop this argument through an account of several recent policy
processes in the Kenyan energy sector, and suggest that a
transnational reading of political and social relations – embedding
domestic energy politics within global policy networks and circuits
of power – illuminates the critical and contested role of the state in
neoliberal energy transitions.
Kenya presents an interesting case study to explore these
politics and the potential of theoretical tools to account for them.
Kenya has enacted neoliberal reforms in the energy sector, while
the state continues to play important roles in energy service deliv-
ery and coordination. The government has attracted significant
investment in both renewable energy generation and conventional
fossil resources. It has taken a pro-active role in articulating a
national climate change strategy, while seeking the development
40 P. Newell, J. Phillips / Geoforum 74 (2016) 39–48of new hydrocarbon reserves. A new suite of constitutional reforms
and development planning processes are re-shaping the way that
formal governance structures are organised, while informal ways
of doing politics persist. To build this account we draw on 29 inter-
views conducted during August–September 2013 with government
officials, donors, businesses and non-governmental organisations
engaged in the policy process; reflections gleaned from a dissemi-
nation event on this research held in Nairobi in 2014; and analysis
of policy documents. This enables process-tracing of key initiatives
and mapping of networks and relations of power between promi-
nent actors, undertaken with participants and users of the research
in Kenya to affirm or challenge our findings.
The paper is structured as follows. First we outline our case for
moving beyond a socio-technical understanding of transitions
towards a political economy understanding of how power operates
through neoliberal processes of transition. Second, we develop a
scalar account of how donors have influenced the ‘landscape’ of
transition through the exercise of disciplinary power to embed
neoliberal reforms in Kenya’s energy sector. Third, we describe
the role played by the Kenyan state and donors in directing the
development of new renewable energy projects within the par-
tially liberalised energy sector. We emphasise the importance of
public risk-taking in the making of markets and the distribution
of value, and the political support that has been mobilised behind
particular technologies. We conclude with some reflections on the
empirical and theoretical findings of the paper.2. From socio-technical to neoliberal transitions
Insights from theories of socio-technical transitions provide a
useful but limited understanding of the ways in which shifts in
energy generation and distribution in Kenya are taking place. The
term ‘socio-technical transition’ can provide both a description of
transformation from one energy system to another, and a set of
tools and concepts to explain and enable such transitions. Aca-
demic work on socio-technical transitions seeks to understand
how, when and where transitions to low-carbon socio-technical
regimes can come about (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Meadowcroft,
2011; Scrase and Smith, 2009). Transitions in this sense refer to
‘deep structural changes’ in systems such as energy that involve
long-term and complex reconfigurations of technology, policy,
infrastructure, scientific knowledge, and social and cultural prac-
tices to sustainable ends (Geels, 2011: 24). A transition implies
‘major technological transformations in the way societal functions
such as transportation, communication, housing, feeding are ful-
filled’ (Geels, 2002: 1257).
A great deal of insight (and debate) into the nature of socio-
technical transitions has been generated through a ‘multilevel per-
spective’ (MLP) on transitions (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Geels, 2002,
2011). The MLP is used to analyse system change through three
heuristic levels: established socio-technical ‘regimes’, broad exoge-
nous ‘landscape’ factors that influence regimes, and ‘niche’ sustain-
ability experiments that might disrupt them. The ‘landscape’ of a
socio-technical system is seen to comprise the structuring forces
of ideologies, institutions, discourses and political and economic
trends that constitute enduring forms of socio-technical organiza-
tion. The socio-technical landscape provides a point of departure
for analysing the ways in which neoliberal principles of energy
governance have been advanced through the institutional power
of international finance institutions exercised in partnership with
state actors. ‘Regimes’ in contrast are made up of the complex of
practices, regulatory requirements, institutions and infrastructures
required to achieve particular societal functions, such as mobility,
cooking or heating. This formulation of a dominant socio-technical
system of generating, distributing and consuming energy invites a(critical) understanding of the role of the state in transitions, which
we seek to provide below. ‘Niches’ meanwhile provide a potential
space within which social and technological learning processes,
networking, and expectations develop in relation to forms of
socio-technical configuration that are alternative to those of a
regime. This helps us to understand patterns of low-carbon innova-
tion developing in Kenya and how they seek to compete for the
attention and resources of actors at different scales.
Despite some recent attempts to pay greater attention to the
role of politics and power in transitions (Geels, 2014; Scoones
et al., 2015), the transitions literature to date has had relatively lit-
tle to say about the politics of which energy sources are prioritised,
by whom and why, and what this means for who secures access to
energy. There is a growing recognition that ‘regime resistance’
(Geels, 2014) matters, and that governments need to exert author-
ity over market actors to initiate more rapid transitions without
detailed attention to the political processes and terrain upon which
they play out. Recognising that varied institutional contexts give
rise to very different forms of decision making and power asymme-
tries that may influence sustainability trajectories in different ways
(Hansen and Coenen, 2015; Kern, 2011; Kuzemko et al., 2016),
requires us to develop specific accounts of the politics and political
economy of contending energy pathways in particular contexts.
In this regard much of the material that we discuss below
addresses the trade-offs between inclusive development and the
promotion of renewable energies. It brings into conflict competing
visions within the Kenyan state with different fractions of domes-
tic and international capital that have a stake in distinct energy
pathways; the commitments of donors to see energy transitions
achieved through market-based mechanisms backed by targeted
state intervention; and the uneven power relations through which
these visions are contested. We are sympathetic, therefore, to the
suggestion from Lawhon and Murphy (2012: 371) to consider:
who is (or is not) represented and included in transition deci-
sions; where and at what scale decisions are made; whose
knowledge counts and why; how power relations influence
regime dynamics, landscape features, and the prospects for
niche innovations.
In this regard emerging literature in Geography has pointed to
the importanceof understanding energy transitionsasuneven social
and spatial processes (Calvert, 2016; Huber, 2015; Rutherford and
Coutard, 2014). These processes involve the ‘reconfiguration of cur-
rent patterns and scales of economic and social activity’ (Bridge
et al., 2013: 331), in which ‘people and places unevenly experience
the costs and benefits of energy extraction, generation, financing,
distribution and consumption’ (Newell and Mulvaney, 2013: 4).
These contributions have helped to address the neglect of power
and social relations that configure questions of energy access and
energy justice, and suggest important starting points for
analysis of the specific features of colonial and post-colonial socio-
technical energy systems that have developed in the South.
However, to complement this emphasis on the uneven social conse-
quences of energy transitions, we still require an account of the
politics, power and social relations that produce those outcomes:
anaccount ofwhy theorganisationof energy systemsprivilege some
actors, interests and classes over others, as part of a broader
account of how political economies influence energy transitions.
3. Political economies of energy transition
Few studies have sought to develop a political economy analysis
of the role of competing energy pathways in Kenya. Most studies to
date on the transition away from fossil fuels in the country have
focussed on the promotion, diffusion and performance of renew-
P. Newell, J. Phillips / Geoforum 74 (2016) 39–48 41able energy (van der Plas and Hankins, 1998; Wamukonya, 2007;
Ondraczek, 2013; Jacobson, 2007). Political economy analysis is,
however, increasingly utilised by donors seeking to understand
the national political context into which development assistance
is received (cf. Routley and Hulme, 2013). Political economy in
these studies is typically understood as the identification of vested
interests and systems of political incentives that frustrate gover-
nance reform programmes, limit the performance of public institu-
tions, and dis-incentivise private investment (Desai, 2011). From
this perspective, Kenya’s failure in recent years to deliver on the
promise of economic transformation has been attributed to a set
of national political and socio-economic relationships charac-
terised by ‘competitive clientalism’: fierce electoral competition
enmeshed in systems of political patronage with strong ethnic
dimensions (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2014; Khan, 2010) where
the political elite have been able to capture public institutions and
resources to serve their private interests (Ng’ethe et al., 2004).
While this literature has focused attention on the specificities of
African polities, it is somewhat constrained by a national frame
of analysis comprised of ruling political elites, state bureaucrats
and domestic firms.
In contrast to these accounts, we develop a global political
economy of energy in Kenya that describes the institutional
embeddedness of socio-technical transition processes within par-
ticular political-economic contexts which strongly shape those
processes (Lawhon and Murphy, 2012). We use this approach to
stress that the relationship between transnational capital and the
domestic political economy belies any sharp distinction between
an external set of international donors and finance institutions
on the one hand, and a bounded set of national and sub-national
institutions on the other Büscher (2009). Relationships between
actors at different scales shape policy directions in particular ‘tran-
sition spaces’ (Coenen et al., 2012). This relational approach is
important in the energy sector, where the relatively fixed location
of resources – such as geothermal activity, solar radiation, and oil
and gas deposits – connect particular places with the transnational
circulation of capital that is mobilised to process resources into
productive energy services (Bridge et al., 2013). The nature of
investments in energy generation in Kenya necessarily involves
trans-local dynamics and transnational networks of institutions
and ideas. Global processes are hence best understood not as exter-
nal forces on the local – but in relation terms.
To describe the geographically specific ways that particular
energy pathways have become institutionally embedded in the
Kenya, we focus our attention on the creation and beneficiaries
of the rules that govern energy in Kenya and what this reveals
about who sets the terms of transition and on whose behalf. This
approach re-directs the attention of socio-technical transitions lit-
erature from the artefacts of renewable energy technologies to the
ways in which differential power affects the inclusion and exclu-
sion of different artefacts in the transition, and the social priorities
that are reflected in the process. Our analysis is structured around
three broad considerations that bring insights from global political
economy to bear upon the literature on socio-technical transitions:
(i) a political economic ‘landscape’ that is shaped by disciplinary
neoliberalism (ii) the conditions under which some ‘niche’ tech-
nologies have been accommodated by an energy ‘regime’, and
(iii) a reflection on the winners and losers of transitions pursued
through neoliberalisation. First, we provide a brief description of
Kenya’s energy sector to contextualise the discussion.4. A global political economy of energy transitions in Kenya
Kenya has one of the lowest electrification rates in Africa with
less than 25% of the population having access to the grid. Giventhe low level of access and poor quality of electricity supply to both
residential and commercial consumers, increasing electricity gen-
eration has become one of the government’s highest priorities, a
core strategy for driving economic growth, and a fiercely compet-
itive electoral issue. For many years drought has affected the reli-
ability of Kenya’s hydropower capacity, forcing the government
into expensive emergency diesel generation that leave the country
vulnerable to the volatility of oil prices and currency exchange
rates. Attempts to diversify Kenya’s electricity supply are driven
largely by these economic and political factors drivers, opening
up opportunities for renewable energy to play a larger role in the
country’s electricity mix.
Electricity generation has failed to keep pace with demand,
such that planned and unplanned service disruptions have been a
regular experience for the largely urban population that has a grid
connection. To meet the government’s ambitions of attaining mid-
dle income country status by 2030 through agricultural moderni-
sation and industrialisation, it is estimated that installed capacity
will be required to increase dramatically from 1606 MW in 2012
to 19,200 MW in 2030 (Government of Kenya, 2006). Short term
goals are no less ambitious. In 2013 the government announced
plans to create 5000 MW of additional electricity generation capac-
ity within 40 months, roughly tripling Kenya’s capacity (Ministry
of Energy and Petroleum, 2013). While these targets are widely
seen as unfeasible outside of government, and exceed the demand
forecast of the government’s own power development plan
(Ministry of Energy, 2011), they are nonetheless indicative of the
political capital invested in rapidly increasing electricity genera-
tion capacity.
These ambitions require massive investments that the state
alone is unable or unwilling to provide and which bring domestic
political economy into play with transnational circulations of
capital. The state and its development partners have now united
behind formal policies that seek to develop a market and
business-friendly environment for independent power producers
through the provision of attractive tax regimes, regulation and
infrastructure to attract international energy investors, particularly
in electricity generation (Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, 2013).
The range of electricity sources available to the Kenyan
government and slated for significant investment includes both
renewable and conventional resources: geothermal energy, coal,
gas, fuel oil and wind power (Ministry of Energy and Petroleum,
2014). Importantly, geothermal energy and certain wind power
sites have been identified as cost-competitive with conventional
sources of electricity, making some renewable sources highly
attractive to the Kenyan government (Ministry of Energy, 2011).
In contrast to many African economies then, resource endow-
ments, technological developments and institutional reforms have
allowed a consensus to emerge around the idea that some indige-
nous sources of renewable energy can serve national development,
growth and energy security as productively as conventional energy
sources. In the account that follows, we discuss some of the trade-
offs that are inherent in the pursuit of different energy pathways,
and the power relations that shape the ways in which these
trade-offs are accommodated or resolved, by whom and for whom.
4.1. The political economic landscape of transition (i) disciplinary
neoliberalism
As noted above, the prospects of successful socio-technical tran-
sitions are assumed to be effected by a diverse series of ‘landscape’
factors (Rip and Kemp, 1998). These include, for example, the role
of donors and international finance in shaping, incentivising, and
dis-incentivising particular energy policy choices at the national
level. In countries such as Kenya that hold little sway in global
trade relations, this dependence on aid and technical assistance
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energy pathways that best align with their own development
priorities. A critical political economy analysis can enhance an
understanding of this terrain by providing an account of the
relations of power that characterise the relationships between
‘exogenous forces’ and the state, which has to mediate, embed or
challenge these forces.
First, we suggest the relevance of the ‘disciplinary’ power of glo-
bal institutions and other economic actors in understanding the
landscape of socio-technical change (Gill, 1995; Gallagher, 2005).
This usefully describes the combination of structural and material
power wielded by these actors over those states dependent upon
them for financial loans and investment, combined with the dis-
cursive power to legitimise, validate and embed neoliberal models
of transition. In developing this account we draw on insights from
work on ‘governance states’ (Harrison, 2004), which describe the
World Bank’s attempts at ‘reconciling a global political economy
with its own designs and a specific set of challenges posed by
the African region’ (2004: v). A high level of external influence
whereby the Bank is intimately involved in policy making means
that any clear distinction between the Bank and an autonomous
state become difficult to discern. Through these negotiations,
energy pathways are narrowed or opened up by the presence
and interests of global actors and their interactions with state
elites.
The particular model of development that has been promoted
through this combination of market discipline and state power is
neoliberal in character. Energy transitions in sub-Saharan Africa
are increasingly occurring in socio-political environments that
are structured by the power and preferences of transnational cap-
ital, expressed as a key set of norms and objectives that are shared
among donors, multinational companies, private financiers, multi-
lateral development banks and state elites (Bayliss and Fine, 2007),
given the paucity of public finance in most cases that can be ded-
icated to transform energy systems. This narrative was articulated
clearly at the Paris climate change summit in December 2015
where the talk was of an impending ‘clean energy revolution’ for
Africa, a vision in which the role for actors such as UNDP and REEEP
(Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership) is to ‘de-
risk’ and scale-up private finance. The Africa Renewable Energy Ini-
tiative (AREI), for example, aims to build at least 100 GW of new
and additional renewable energy generation capacity by 2020,
and 300 GW by 2030. This coalesces around a model of energy
development that is private-led (while allowing ample opportunity
for the collection of rents by the state), has significant export-
potential, is primarily grid-connected, and is able to meet the sup-
pressed demand of commercial business. Disagreements persist
among these actors as to which energy sources best meet those cri-
teria and the extent to which they should be low carbon, but the
overall (neoliberal) model of ownership, management, and control
is rarely challenged. The World Bank has been instrumental in
embedding this model of energy development in the South over
several decades, through a combination of large development loans
for privatisation, conditionalities for access to foreign capital, and
the construction of epistemic communities and networks of advo-
cates for the liberalisation of energy (cf. Goldman, 2007).
Neoliberalisation has involved a significant shift in the manage-
ment norms and distribution of power in the Kenyan energy
regime. Yet clear distinctions cannot be made between an era of
state-led and privatised energy in Kenya. Prior to liberalisation,
an energy regime characterised by highly centralised management
and dependency on large hydropower had been created through
large state-capital infrastructure projects, built by foreign investors
and subsidised by the state, while providing ample opportunities
for rent collection by Kenyan elites. Commissioned in 1986, the
Turkwel Gorge Dam project was considered to have involved suchserious contractual irregularities, cost inflations, and evidence of
bribery that a full aid embargo was imposed by Kenya’s donor
group including the World Bank and IMF (Hawley, 2003), but
which was also driven by the government’s refusal to initiate
reforms that included greater private sector participation in the
sector (Tellam, 2000).
Faced with stalled investments in generation capacity, power
outages and rationing, the government then agreed to undertake
the energy sector reforms laid down by the Bank. Consistent with
the mode of discipline and reward that is applied to ‘governance
states’ (Harrison, 2004), the embargo was then lifted and in 1996
the World Bank agreed to lend the Kenyan government US$125
million as part of a $700 million package of investments in the
country’s power sector, focused on legal and regulatory frame-
works that were designed to attract private sector participation
and achieve associated efficiency gains. Tellam (2000: 66)
describes the Energy Sector Reform Project that resulted as a ‘clear
example of the World Bank applying pressure on a low-income
country to commercialize and privatize its energy sector’. The
World Bank’s involvement in the Kenyan energy sector began in
earnest, allowing the Bank to define the problems of the energy
sector by linking state failure to load-shedding and reliance on
one hydrological basin for hydropower (World Bank, 2005).
As in many other countries, this has resulted in the liberalisa-
tion of Kenya’s energy sector, but not its wholesale privatisation.
Publicly owned or partially privatised utilities in Kenya have been
restructured towards operating on a commercial basis with limited
public subsidy, and operating cost reflective tariffs for electricity
consumers (Ministry of Energy, 2004; Vagliasindi and Besant-
Jones, 2013). The partial privatisation of the energy sector reflects
the World Bank’s own shift in policy, which has recognised from
experience that states cannot be replaced by markets in one-size
fits all policy prescriptions for privatisation (World Bank, 2004).
Yet, rather than a reconsideration of the role of state provision or
the limits of private participation, the Bank’s policy revisions have
positioned states as the facilitators of investment and the enablers
of conditions for private sector participation to flourish (Bayliss
and Fine, 2007). Short of privatisation, citizens become customers,
and the poorer ones rendered unprofitable for either private sector
companies or corporatised public sector companies in a model that
McDonald calls ‘electric capitalism’ (McDonald, 2009). This
restructuring process has, nevertheless, made Kenya an attractive
investment environment for independent power producers, creat-
ing a shift in the ownership and management norms of the Kenyan
energy regime.4.2. The political economic landscape of transition (ii) technology
choice in a partially liberalised market
In the partially liberalised energy market then, international
investors have gained a key foothold as Kenya looks to foreign
investment in infrastructure, but the state and donors retain signif-
icant roles in the formal and informal governance of energy.
Donors have played an important role in setting the tone for
energy policy in this regard, using their collective power to steer
Kenya toward cleaner forms of electricity generation for domestic
consumption, while maintaining support for fossil fuels such as oil
that are extracted by donor country firms and exported for con-
sumption in the global North (AFD, 2013). A solar energy ‘niche’
was a beneficiary of this shift, supported by the UK Department
for International Development and the German Technical Agency
GTZ to conduct a Policy Dialogue process in parallel to the
Government’s drafting of the Energy Act in the early 2000s. In
one of the first encounters of the solar energy niche with the
Kenyan energy regime, solar advocates joined forces with
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were not stripped from the Energy Act of 2006 (Byrne, 2009).
Kenya’s adoption of neoliberal reforms in the energy sector has
been rewarded by support from bilateral and multilateral donors,
opening up opportunities for foreign capital to meet the shortfall
in energy supply. Kenya has been described as an obvious choice
of pilot country for climate finance mechanisms such as the World
Bank’s Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Programme (SREP), because of
the market-orientated governance of a sector dependent on inter-
national expertise and technologies (Climate Investment Funds,
2011). In this respect, Kenya has been described as ‘the pilot for
everything’1 and is often compared favourably with neighbours,
such as Tanzania, on the basis that, as a World Bank official put it
to us, ‘Kenya has always been private sector focused and avoided
the virulent forms of socialism of some of its neighbours’.2 This is
not to suggest that investors do not face considerable uncertainty
in Kenya – exemplified by devolution, delays in the revision of
energy laws, the revoking of licenses, and short term revisions of
electricity tariffs – but foreign investment that can generate rents
has been facilitated by successive Kenya governments and ruling
elites (Tellam, 2000; Ng’ethe et al., 2004).
China has nevertheless emerged as a potential contender to the
power of western donors. The availability of Chinese financing
could provide the basis of a broader shift in the geopolitical ‘land-
scape’ that shapes both technology choice and the policy auton-
omy of the Kenyan state. Particularly in relation to the large
hydropower regime, Chinese loans are thought to come with fewer
‘strings attached’ such as the KSh150 billion (around US$1.5 bil-
lion) High Grand Falls hydro project which was a focus of a trip
in 2013 to Nairobi by senior officials from the Chinese Exim bank.
According to Treasury officials, Kenya ‘will never be left behind by
the World Bank’,3 but it can increasingly look to China for alterna-
tive sources of finance that are perceived to be faster, come with
fewer conditions, and are more flexible. As a World Bank official
put it: the World Bank is ‘not the only show in town. . .like 20 years
ago’.4 Specifically China might be tempted to benefit from the reluc-
tance of Western development banks to invest in fossil fuels and
insist on procedural norms of consultation in the development of
large hydropower projects, to secure new projects with the Kenyan
state. An IFC official suggested: ‘With the discovery of oil in Turkana
and coal in Kitui areas, the government is becoming more assertive.
The government offered a 1000 MW opportunity on coal, but donors
and investors are reluctant in investing in it because of the green-
house gas effects’.5
Despite this potential for greater autonomy for the Kenyan
state, traditional donors can present a powerful force when they
coordinate their positions. Beyond differences in their preferences
and power, Kenya’s ‘traditional’ donors have operated as market
facilitators in their interventions, paving the way for further pene-
tration of the energy sector by transnational capital. This has
included commercial diplomacy through, for example, ‘Low carbon
networking events’ organised by UK Trade and Investment and
attended by firms such as Balfour Beatty, EGS Energy and Aldwych
International interested in opportunities to invest in new infras-
tructures around power generation, transmission and distribution
projects. It also included finance capital in the form of carbon1 Interview with senior energy sector specialist, World Bank, Nairobi, 21 August
2013.
2 Interview with senior energy sector specialist, World Bank, Nairobi, 21 August
2013.
3 Interview with senior staff, Ministry of Finance, National Treasury 15 August
2013.
4 Interview with senior energy sector specialist, World Bank, Nairobi, 21 August
2013.
5 Interview with senior energy sector specialist, World Bank, Nairobi, 21 August
2013.finance and private equity groups such as Climate Change Capital
and other investment funds wanting to invest in geothermal
resources.
While the state-led, large hydropower-dominated energy sector
has always required international investment in infrastructure, a
shift in the Kenyan energy regime has occurred, in which there is
a common material interest and discursive commitment on the
part of both donors and the Kenyan state to the virtues and neces-
sity of private sector investment across the energy sector, and the
creation of investment conditions required to attract it. Patrick
Nyoike, former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Energy, sta-
ted clearly in an address to investors, ‘the Government appreciates
that it is not possible to raise all the required funds and within the
desired period without the participation of both public and private
sectors . . . Private sector participation is, therefore, actively
encouraged through a number of avenues’.6 In the following sec-
tion, we consider how state actors have sought to accommodate
these donor and private sector interests while seeking to retain
material power and authority over the energy sector. We explore
this through the case of climate change policy.4.3. Accommodating landscape pressures in the regime: climate
change mainstreaming
To accommodate donor interests and to lever sources of inter-
national public and private finance, new national legislation has
sought to mainstream climate change into Kenyan policy. As a pro-
duct of fossil fuel consumption, climate change mitigation poses a
direct threat to globally integrated energy systems that are based
on the widespread use of oil, coal and gas, and the political and
economic systems that benefit from the revenues that resource
exploitation generates (Mitchell, 2011). Studies of energy transi-
tions elsewhere in Africa, for example, have shown that the drive
for a greater role for renewable energy is seen as a threat not only
to the profitability of particular energy industries, but also to the
power base of state-capital elites who are reluctant to open up
the market to new players, or to cede control over the energy base
of their economies (Baker et al., 2014). In other words, incumbent
regimes will often accommodate and diffuse pressures to reform or
transform existing energy systems.
In this regard a suite of legislative instruments and plans frame
Kenyan government efforts to mainstream climate change into sec-
toral policies. The Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) (Government
of Kenya, 2013) in particular has been developed by the Ministry of
Environment and Mineral Resources (MEMR) to reduce Kenya’s
vulnerability to climate change and to improve the country’s
access to climate finance. The CCAP aims to ‘climate-proof’ Kenya’s
long term development plan, Vision 2030 (Government of Kenya,
2006). Meanwhile the Least Cost Power Development Plan
(Ministry of Energy, 2011) identifies priority resources for power
generation, which in turn informs the President’s targets for
additional power generation (Ministry of Energy and Petroleum,
2013) and the country’s energy policy, which is being updated to
align with the new constitution (2010) and to incorporate legisla-
tion to govern new petroleum discoveries.
While each of these policy processes and frameworks has a
distinct mandate, they are united in their framing of energy as an
‘enabler’ of development (Government of Kenya, 2006). For Kenya’s
bilateral donors, the climate change mainstreaming process is one
that should promote ‘climate compatible development’ (CDKN,
2013) in the hope that the integration of development, climate
change mitigation, and adaptation might legitimise emission6 Mr. Patrick Nyoike Permanent Secretary Ministry of Energy, remarks at Low
Carbon Networking Event 3rd October 2012 Crowne Plaza hotel Nairobi.
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change is negligible. Indeed, it is perhaps indicative of the discur-
sive power of ideas about mainstreaming climate change that the
process of creating the Climate Change Action Plan was described
as ‘smooth’, ‘efficient’, ‘inclusive’ and ‘consensus-forming’ by a
range of actors for whom addressing climate change in policy
would necessarily involve confronting the established interests of
the energy regime. This includes the Ministry of Energy, for whom
the Climate Change Action Plan was not anticipated to significantly
alter the direction of its Energy Policy or the source of large scale
power generation determined by the Least Cost Power Develop-
ment Plan (Ministry of Energy, 2011).7
While potentially providing direction to the course of change,
these visions tend to obscure some of the key trade-offs around
energy choices and their implications. In 2013 President Kibaki
rejected proposed legislation to institutionalise an independent cli-
mate change authority to ensure government compliance with its
climate change aims, ostensibly on the basis of insufficient consul-
tation. As a result, climate change policy coordination remained
under the relatively junior Ministry of Environment and Natural
Resources, with little power to circumscribe or direct the activities
of more powerful ministries. Yet, partly as a result of the framing of
climate change as an opportunity, revision of the rejected Climate
Change Bill in Kenya remained a priority in Kenya for many politi-
cians, as a means to attract international climate funds for adapta-
tion and for ‘green growth’ opportunities in renewable energy
markets. Mainstreaming climate change mitigation has been suc-
cessful in so far as it can increase the attractiveness of low carbon
options without dis-incentivising high carbon development activi-
ties, avoiding direct conflict with powerful incumbent interests
within the state – especially the Ministry of Energy – and private
sector.
Nevertheless, the framing of climate-compatible development
‘triple-wins’ disguises the competing criteria that guide the most
recent energy policy: ‘To facilitate provision of clean, sustainable,
affordable, competitive, reliable and secure energy services at least
cost while protecting the environment’ (Ministry of Energy and
Petroleum, 2014: viii). In these terms it is perfectly consistent for
the policy to promote renewable energy to ‘enhance energy secu-
rity, mitigate climate change, generate income, create employment
and generate foreign exchange savings’ (Ministry of Energy and
Petroleum, 2014: 42), while at the same time heralding coal as
‘one of the indigenous sources of energy that will drive the devel-
opment of strategic initiatives for Vision 2030’ (Ministry of Energy
and Petroleum, 2014: 37). Perhaps unsurprisingly, renewable
energy is considered supplementary to established hydropower
and fossil fuel investments.
What results is an eclectic and in many ways incompatible set
of promises: to deliver on developmental commitments to tackle
energy poverty, to assure investors and consumers that
opportunities to exploit fossil fuels are not being ruled out, and
to pursue these options in a low-carbon way. Donor interests can
be accommodated by the Kenyan government through efforts to
mainstream climate change in policy-making. The process of pro-
ducing visions and strategies is revealing of competing ideas about
energy trajectories and the material interests at stake across differ-
ent parts of the state and among investors in different energy
sources and technologies, which have to be accommodated in
political deal-brokering. In this regard it is to the calculation and
negotiation of commercial risk and reward that we now turn, dis-
cussed in relation to socio-technical transitions literature on the
necessary conditions for ‘strategic niche management’ to support
innovative breakthrough technologies.7 Interview with senior staff, Ministry of Energy, Nairobi, 19 August 2013.4.4. Accommodating niches in the regime
Beyond the forms of structural and disciplinary power at play
on the terrain of energy policy, a political economy account also
needs to account for the practices of market-making and bringing
neoliberalisation into being in the energy sector. A common insight
in political economy, informed by the work of Karl Polanyi in par-
ticular ([1944] 1980), is that markets have to be made and re-made
through extensive political work. They do not emerge sponta-
neously and neither are they self-regulating entities. Rather, they
have to be constructed, bought into being, regulated and
re-regulated (Castree, 2008). The same is true of the development
of the market for energy technologies and services in Kenya.
Debates about transitions often assume a key and benign role for
the state as facilitator and enabler of transitions, and in providing
forms of transition management (Kern and Smith, 2008). Emphasis
is often placed on the merits or otherwise of ‘picking winners’, that
is, providing state support to energy sources or technologies that
governments believe can best meet a set of policy objectives. As
Lawton and Murphy note, ‘Importantly, and sometimes problemat-
ically, the state is typically portrayed as a progressive, collabora-
tive, ‘‘facilitator-stimulator-controller-director” of the transition
management process’ (Lawhon and Murphy, 2012: 359).
In this regard it is important to consider the extent to which the
Kenyan state has sought to accommodate different energy sources
within the existing regime. Technological support has been pro-
vided or withheld through formal and informal mechanisms to
define and serve national interests, while accommodating the pref-
erences of donors. For large-scale domestic electricity generation
the state is dependent on transnational companies to meet the
level of demand and the expertise for both conventional and
unconventional energy technologies. Calculations of private sector
risk and reward have become highly contested, however, and have
been central to the process of directing change through the distri-
bution of value and responsibility for two renewable energy tech-
nologies that have seen recent growth in Kenya: solar photovoltaic
(PV) technology, and geothermal energy.
4.4.1. Solar power and the limits of the niche
Low levels of state support for solar PV technologies closely
reflect the historic interests of Kenya’s energy sector institutions
in on-grid, centralised provision of electricity from energy sources.
Broadly speaking, off-grid solar technologies have been incompat-
ible with the government’s framing of energy poverty and appro-
priate grid-based solutions, and have received limited state
support (Ockwell and Byrne, 2016). Nonetheless the market for
off-grid solar system in Kenya has grown since the 1970s into
the largest in Africa in spite of the state, largely driven by socio-
cultural change in rural Kenya and the role that solar PV and
urban-rural financial transfers have played in meeting new
demands for communicative technologies such as television and
mobile phones (Jacobson, 2007). Through the private off-grid
market, basic electricity demand is met, with the capital cost of
infrastructure met by the consumer rather than the state.
Limited support for off-grid solar energy is typically justified
with reference to powerful neoliberal narratives of the virtues of
the market, private-sector-led development and the role of ‘energy
entrepreneurs’ in Kenya (Hankins, 2000). Yet, while the Kenyan
government has not provided consumer subsidies for solar PV
technologies, neither has the growth of solar PV technologies in
Kenya been the free market success story that it is often claimed
to be (IFC, 1998). Historical accounts of market-making in Kenya
have demonstrated the degree of donor support that has been
necessary to build professional networks, create demand, absorb
risk and support the early experimentation that was critical in
the growth of the solar home systems market niche (Ockwell and
10 Interview with senior staff, Ministry of Finance, Treasury. Nairobi, 15 August
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trepreneurs’ – did not build a market alone, but were dependent
on donors to shoulder commercial risks that entrepreneurs them-
selves were unable to take. The description of Kenya’s off-grid solar
market by the IFC (1998: 12) as ‘a true free market for PV products’
is therefore not reflective of the reality, but points to a powerful
narrative of free market development that has shaped the limited
role that solar PV technology has come to play in Kenya’s energy
mix.
In contrast, more direct support has been created for indepen-
dent power producers to supply the grid with electricity from
renewable sources. The feed-in tariff has received donor support
as a niche policy intervention throughout the region, but has been
implemented in Kenya in a way that reflects the interests of the
prevailing energy regime. Currently, solar power project develop-
ers can provide electricity only at a higher unit price than alterna-
tive options such as geothermal power, coal, or hydropower
imports from Ethiopia. For solar power, the government has set
the tariff that is paid to independent power producers at a level
that is acknowledged to be insufficient to mitigate the commercial
risks of project development. An interview quote from an official in
the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum bears out the competing
framings of the appropriate role of solar, and who stands to benefit
from its promotion:
Investors are more concerned about making quick returns
rather than large-scale impact and transformation of poor peo-
ple’s lives. This is why they complain about feed in tariffs being
low. The government thinks these tariffs are reasonable both for
consumers and investors. This is the reason why solar produc-
tion is low. The government does not want consumers to pay
higher for energy’.8
This defensiveness about the uncompetitive price for solar per-
haps derives from claims about deliberate attempts within govern-
ment to limit the role of solar in the energy mix. One member of
the Kenyan energy regulator (the Energy Regulatory Commission)
noted that: ‘As an advocate for renewable energy, I can say that
the decision to price solar low was a deliberate one’, referring to
the role played by the former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry
of Energy in dictating that tariffs for on-grid solar, in particular,
would be purposefully set too low to attract investment.9
Having formally adopted the feed-in tariff policy as a niche pol-
icy intervention, the scope to reject grid-connected solar power has
been maintained through control of the risk and reward profile of
the feed-in tariff, exercised by both individuals and institutions
within government. Indeed, after five years of the feed-in tariff pol-
icy, no grid-connected solar power projects yet exist in Kenya, dur-
ing which time there have been successive short-term changes in
the level of incentives provided for project developers (Ministry
of Energy, 2012). Donor-promoted feed-in tariffs have been side-
lined by governments throughout the region in favour of direct
power purchase agreements with private investors and associated
risk mitigation tools, such as those developed to attract investment
in large scale wind and geothermal energy projects which better fit
the existing regime (EED Advisory, 2014). It to these projects that
we turn next.
4.4.2. Renewable energy in the regime
In contrast to solar power, large scale geothermal and wind
power have both gained status as priority investment areas in
Kenya and received greater state support. Like solar PV, the control8 Interview with senior staff, Ministry of Energy, Nairobi, 19 August 2013.
9 Interview with Director of Renewable Energy, Energy Regulatory Commission,
Nairobi, 15 August 2013.of risk and reward has been central to the political control of
technology choices (Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, 2013).
Geothermal energy in particular provides a least-cost, scalable
source of low carbon, domestically available, base load electricity
supply – a ‘win-win’ technology behind which donor and govern-
ment interests align.10 To attract foreign capital, the Kenyan state
has sought to provide an enabling environment to develop the coun-
try’s geothermal sites, channelled through a government-owned
special purpose vehicle - the Geothermal Development Company
(GDC) – which has been established to assume the risk of resource
mapping and exploration that the private sector is unwilling to take.
This state support builds on a long history of public sector resources
invested in the reduction of risk, dating back to seismic surveying
and exploration activity of the Government of Kenya and the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
Where public money has been targeted towards the develop-
ment of technology and technological capabilities, and has
assumed commercial development risk, the state is then required
to demonstrate its contribution to project development through
negotiation of the risk-reward calculation with investors, typically
through a power purchase agreement (PPA) between independent
power producers and the Kenyan utility. To secure investment, the
Kenyan government is required to provide both commercial incen-
tives and ensure confidence that investors will realise a return on
investment. For the Ministry of Finance, Kenya has done more than
enough to comply with the disciplinary conditions of good eco-
nomic behaviour, by providing adequate assurances for energy
investors, complying with the norms of good governance, permit-
ting repatriation of profits by investors, and improving political
security in recent years that have improved the country’s credit
rating. The Ministry of Finance has however, drawn the line at pro-
viding sovereign guarantees against the risk of default by its elec-
tricity sector institutions, refusing to ‘bow to the private sector’, as
one Treasury official put it.11
The remaining commercial risk to large energy sector projects
has created opportunities for multilateral development banks to
remain relevant in Kenya amid global competition with the sorts
of Chinese sources of infrastructure financing noted above. Partial
Risk Guarantees cover private financiers against the risk of a public
entity failing to meet its obligations to a power project, such as the
construction of electricity transmission lines, or timely payment
for electricity received.12 Kenya’s largest renewable energy project,
the Lake Turkana Wind Power project, was able to reach financial
closure only with a partial risk guarantee from the African Develop-
ment Bank, after the World Bank had withdrawn its support, judging
that the power purchase agreement would burden the Kenyan elec-
tricity distribution company with the risk of paying for electricity
that it was not able to receive if infrastructure was not completed
on time.
These knowledge- and capital-intensive energy development
processes necessarily deepen the mutual but uneven dependence
of the Kenyan state upon transnational capital. For off-grid and
on-grid solar technologies, and for geothermal resource exploita-
tion, the risk of commercial development and the distribution of
rewards have been central to the determination of how energy
trade-offs are managed, and on whose terms. New sources of clean
energy production are attractive to the Kenyan government, but, as
described above, departments and individual bureaucrats have
scope to resist landscape pressures to adopt policies to support2013.
11 Interview with senior staff, Ministry of Finance, National Treasury. Nairobi, 15
August 2013.
12 Interview with senior energy sector specialist, World Bank, Nairobi, 21 August
2013.
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this respect, efforts to build political support for deployment of
renewable energy by downplaying trade-offs are ultimately
unhelpful. Feed-in tariffs, for example, inherently produce trade-
offs, yet the United Nations Environment Programme, cites the
prospective benefits as ‘a ‘‘triple-win” of additional renewables-
based generation capacity to the country; enhancing employment
and poverty alleviation in the rural areas; and increasing income
opportunities for business development’ (UNEP, undated).
These examples of technology support in Kenya each demon-
strate the importance of market-making by a transnational set of
actors operating at different scales. The form that this market-
making process has taken in Kenya is mixed, but can be broadly
described as guided by the logics of ‘green neoliberalism’, which
precedes the emergence of renewable energy technologies as
cost-competitive options for electricity generation (Goldman,
2007). Through network building and resource and infrastructure
development, the Kenyan state and donors have been instrumental
in creating the conditions in which renewable energy options have
become an attractive energy solution in the emerging market-led
Kenyan energy regime. Importantly, they have done so not simply
through the creation of ‘enabling environments’ for supposedly free
markets to flourish, but through active intervention and risk-taking
that is rarely acknowledged. The role of development finance insti-
tutions in the Lake Turkana Wind Power Project was critical in this
respect, as was the role of donors in supporting networks of off-grid
solar entrepreneurs to develop technological capabilities through
the local adaptation and development of imported technologies.
Yet the primary role for the state has been to act as facilitator of a
neoliberal model of energy development rather than an
interventionist ‘green entrepreneurial state’ (Mazzucato, 2015),
further embedding neoliberalism in the energy sector.5. Neoliberal transitions: energy for whom and at what cost?
The literature on socio-technical transitions has devoted less
attention to the winners and losers that are created by particular
modes of governance, and it is instructive to consider who benefits
from the model of neoliberal energy policy being rolled out in a
given context as befits a political economy analysis of distributional
issues. Assessing the impacts of these reforms at household level is
beyond the scope of this paper, but tracing policy processes reveals
how energy policy is framed and produced and for whom.
Transnational actors have been actively involved in creating the
neoliberal market conditions under which renewable energy
development has proceeded in Kenya to date. These have included
waves of de-regulation and re-regulation, where initiatives around
pricing and access seek to address the problems created by liberal-
isation as well as under-writing and distributing risk in ways
favourable to capital. Opportunities have arisen for the large-
scale deployment of wind energy in particular, financed and owned
by an array of transnational actors and companies such as Aldwych
International who co-developed the Lake Turkana wind power pro-
ject with KPLC (Kenya Power and Lighting Company) and KETRACO
(Kenya Electricity Transmission Company), and with investment
from global giant Google, to connect the wind farm to the grid
(which is expected to start supplying electricity in 2017). In the
case of geothermal, the US company Ormat Technologies has
developed Olkaria III - the first privately funded and developed
geothermal project in Africa.
Running though all discussions and any attempt to
de-carbonise the energy sector, are deeply politicised questions
of who accesses electricity and other energy services. The respec-
tive demands of industrial and domestic energy users, off-grid
and on-grid users, and wealthy and poor users in rural and urbanareas, all imply important social and environmental trade-offs that
institutions and policy-processes have to manage and which will
profoundly shape the social and spatial geographies of energy
access. In a country where grid access stands at less than 25%,
the beneficiaries of additional grid-connected electricity genera-
tion are the minority. Adequate and inexpensive electricity is a
critical condition for frustrated industrial growth and agricultural
modernisation, yet this often overlooks support for rural popula-
tions for whom electricity is typically not used for ‘productive’ pur-
poses (Jacobson, 2007). For the advocates of neoliberal reforms,
however, reducing public spending, increasing the role of the pri-
vate sector, and the restructuring of publicly owned companies
are essential to provide financial sustainability, attract investment,
and extend grid services to the poor, even if the evidence of private
sector performance against these assumptions in Africa is, at best,
mixed (Bayliss and Fine, 2007).
Having implemented neoliberal reforms in the energy sector,
initiating what McDonald (2009) refers to as ‘electric capitalism’,
donors have also been involved in mobilising energy entrepreneurs
to help provide energy access for those people left behind by
power sector reforms, through projects to build markets for off-
grid solar technologies targeted at citizens that are unlikely to
receive a grid connection or be able to afford the electricity that
is supplied at market rates. Recent developments in the off-grid
solar market have seen Kenya’s successful mobile money transfer
service, M-PESA, mobilised to eliminate the upfront cost of solar
lighting and reduce the expenditure of the poor on kerosene
(Rolffs et al., 2016). While these new financial and technological
models are developed to enable profit making at the ‘bottom of
the pyramid’ (Prahalad, 2005), there is little appetite among either
donors or government for redistributive measures that would
ensure adequate levels of secure electricity supply to meet basic
living standards or productive uses. The dual approach to energy
sector support is consistent with Harrison’s (2004: 4) emphasis
upon the role of governance states in embedding neoliberalism
in Africa, in which attempts are made to resolve the problem of
low energy access generated or sustained by first wave structural
adjustment policies through second-generation reforms.
A purposeful energy transition seemingly requires some level of
centralised planning, rent management and state intervention. In a
country where the Ministry of Energy has centralised control, who
is represented in energy policy will determine who speaks for what
transition and on whose behalf. The fact that the interests of elites
who are involved in making key decisions on energy investment,
technologies and institutions do not align readily with those with-
out energy access highlights the importance of who controls the
production, technology and flows of finance that will underpin a
transition. These interests are complicated by the re-scaling of
regional and subnational geographies: The route of planned pipeli-
nes to connect Ugandan oil fields to the East African coast have
been associated with significant geopolitical shifts in the region,
while the protracted process of devolution instigated by Kenya’s
constitutional reforms has created new sites of political contesta-
tion within the state. Counties have been in conflict with the highly
centralised Ministry of Energy over claims for control of resources
and responsibility over grid extension. Who speaks for different
energy technologies and socio-technical arrangements is impor-
tant in shaping whose ideas and visions of development are
enacted in policy. This includes different sections of the business
community, where smaller business associations such as the
Kenyan Renewable Energy Association (KEREA) seek to make their
voice over the larger industry associations such as the Kenya
Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) or the Kenyan Association of
Manufacturers (KAM) that are better placed claim to speak for
capital-in-general when calling for least-cost energy irrespective
of whether or not it is fossil-fuel based.
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captures the value of energy booms, and who bears the price,
including which social or ethno-regional groups are expected to
offer sacrifices in the name of national economic development.
Representation in Kenya’s electoral system creates few incentives
for national politicians to govern collectively or to create transfor-
mative developmental policies (Kelsall, 2008). Reforms targeting a
reduction of executive power and devolution appear not to address
the lack of ethno-regional inclusion in national politics (Booth and
Gooloba-Mutebi, 2014), while the significant new financial flows to
Kenya’s 47 counties create significant new competition for the cap-
ture of state resources. Meanwhile new financial value is given to
land that lies above newly valued renewable energy flows, such
as wind and solar radiation. Turkana, one of the poorest regions
of Kenya, is now home to the construction site of Africa’s largest
wind farm, as well as being the centre of oil and gas exploration
activity. Samburu, Turkana and Rendile pastoralists have grazed
livestock on this land in Northern Kenya for generations. The
development of geothermal resources has added new value to land
that is subject to long standing conflict and legal disputes, con-
tested by Kikuyu landowners who claim private tenure dating from
the post-independence allocation of land, and the Maasai, who
have claimed rights over the land for some 400 years, and whose
movements are restricted by a network of pipelines.
6. Economies in transition?
This is a critical time for Kenya in deciding its energy future, and
whether and how it might pursue a more equitable, lower carbon
pathway. Issues of power and political economywill play a key role
in determining the winners and losers from different energy path-
ways, and on whose terms the trade-offs between competing pol-
icy objectives are resolved. The case of Kenya suggests the
importance of further refining analytical frameworks for under-
standing the political terrain upon which competing visions about
desirable energy futures collide and will have to be reconciled in a
context of sharp inequalities in power. A failure to account for the
institutions that govern regimes in specific contexts has limited the
ability of transition literature to explain spatially uneven processes
of transition (Lawhon and Murphy, 2012). To address this concern,
we have emphasised a political economy account of energy transi-
tions that focuses on institutions and relations of power to evalu-
ate the structures and actors that govern energy regimes, and the
uneven outcomes that they produce. While we have presented
Kenya as a case study, the forms and sites of power that are evident
in Kenyan energy sector cannot be captured within a national
frame of analysis. Rather, global relations constitute the specific
territorial, institutional and political-economic environments in
which transitions occur.
Our account draws on the insights of literature that helps to
account for the interface between domestic and international fac-
tors in shaping the politics of energy in Kenya, going beyond what
scholars of socio-technical transitions refer to more benignly as
‘landscape’ and ‘regime’ factors respectively. We suggest the
importance of ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’, as practiced by key
development agencies andmultilateral development banks, in con-
straining the policy autonomy and ‘developmental space’ of poorer
countries over whom they exercise control through their lending
practices (Gill, 1995; Gallagher, 2005). We suggest that this has
occurred through first wave power sector reforms and then a sec-
ond wave of interventions aimed at trying to address energy pov-
erty and the challenge of de-carbonisation simultaneously, a
dynamic usefully understood through the lens of governance states
(Harrison, 2004). This raises key questions about what instruments
states have available to them to address the challenges of de-
carbonising their economies in a socially just manner, when manyhave ceded direct control over the energy sector. The disciplinary
role of international finance institutions in shaping energy sector
liberalisation in Kenya requires an account that is transnational,
with due attention to how capital and domestic political econo-
mies are intertwined.
A global political economy of energy emphasises the liberal
market context in which energy transitions have to occur, and
what this means for how, and for whom, they are organised. While
competition over technology choice is highly visible, the domi-
nance of market ideology in decision-making is more opaque, sup-
porting existing regimes, and avoiding confrontation of more
fundamental trade-offs with different forms of socio-technical
ordering (Geels, 2014). Under such conditions, alternative energy
futures that involve more radical socio-technical and political
change than technology substitution can be easily side-lined and
excluded. In this sense while the adoption of renewable energy is
pluralising technology options, it is doing so without disrupting
existing power relations in the energy system. Prospects appear
remote for a ‘just transition’ in Kenya, in which energy pathways
are shaped by the needs and preferences of the poor majority
and questions of energy access and social justice are paramount.
In an investor-led, donor-shaped policy context where finance
and technology choices are shaped by private and international
actors and state elites, the interests of poorer groups in Kenyan
society are easily marginalised.
Key moments when competing policy objectives are openly dis-
cussed and attempts are made to reconcile and integrate them are
revealing of the power dynamics at work. In a practical and con-
crete sense, a political economy analysis such as this provides a
tool for those within and beyond Kenya wanting an understanding
of the political landscape and terrain of power they have to navi-
gate in order to affect change. At the moment the balance of power
in Kenya is clearly tipped in favour of the advocates of neoliberal
energy policies and those who stand to benefit most from them.
But attention to the power relations that structure competing nar-
ratives and interests might provide opportunities for coalitions to
emerge that better balance the inherent trade-offs of energy poli-
cies in the South.Acknowledgement
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